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Marburger  (2006)  explored  the  link  between  absenteeism  and  exam 
performance  by  assessing  the  impact  on  absenteeism  of  removing  a 
university wide policy of mandatory attendance for a single class. His 
results indicate that while an attendance policy has a strong impact on 
reducing  absenteeism  the  link  between  absenteeism  and  exam 
performance is weak. 
This paper presents an alternative exploration into the link between 
absenteeism  and  exam  performance  by  assessing  the  impact  of 
implementing a module-specific attendance policy. Our results suggest the 
link  between  absenteeism  and  exam  performance  is  strong,  and  that 
student-specific  factors  are  important, including  revision  strategies and 
peer  group  effects.  These  results  question  the  uniformity  of  the 
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1. Introduction 
 
It  is  generally  accepted  by  tutors  that  there  is  a  positive  relationship  between 
attendance and student achievement; this view is supported by Grendron and Pieper 
(2005)  who  demonstrate  that  a  strong  negative  link  between  absenteeism  and 
assessment performance is usually reported in the literature although the statistical 
significance of this link is not consistently found. For sceptics of mandatory policies 
on attendance (such as Petress, 1996) this lack of significance is enough to challenge 
the idea that such policies offer universities the ‘golden bullet’ that will improve both 
their overall marks and their progression rates. 
Against this background Marburger (2006) presents an empirical study of the 
impact of relaxing an American university’s mandatory attendance policy for a 1
st 
year undergraduate module in order to identify whether the lack of policy influenced 
attendance and whether attendance affected the student’s grade on the module. His 
contribution  to  the  literature  is  in  response  to  Romer’s  (1993)  suggestion  for  an 
attempt to measure the “pure” effect of absenteeism on exam performance. 
The  purpose  of  this  paper  is  to  analyse  the  methodology  and  findings  of 
Marburger (2006) and to identify whether the effect of implementing an attendance 
policy had a similar effect as removing an attendance policy. If it does not then there 
might be evidence that the perspectives of Grendron and Pieper (2005), Petress (1996) 
and Marburger (2006) could all be acceptable in different circumstances. Although we 
emphasise that Marburger’s findings are far from conclusive because of concerns over 
the credibility of removing a university-wide mandatory attendance policy for a single 
seminar group and because the potential impacts of peer group effects and revision 
strategies  are  not  explicitly  taken  into  account,  our  main  conclusion  is  that  the 
relationship between attendance and exam performance may not be uniform across 
different rates of attendance; the effect of attendance criteria on exam performance are 
likely to be much stronger at low levels of attendance and are likely to reduce as 
attendance rate rise. A small empirical analysis complements our arguments 
 
2. Marburger’s (2006) study 
 
There are two main ways of measuring the impact of an attendance policy on exam 
performance. Our choice will depend on the university: 
 
1.  We can relax a university-wide mandatory attendance policy so that it does not 
apply to a sample of students. This strategy is generally more applicable in US 
universities  where  there  are  usually  attendance  policies,  as  employed  by 
Marburger (2006). 
 
2.  We can create an attendance policy and apply it to a sample of students in an 
institution  where  there  is  no  university-wide  attendance  policy.  This  is 
generally more applicable to universities in the UK and is employed here in 
our statistical analysis. 
 
Both  approaches  are  valid  in  their  own  right.  The  question  is  however:  will  the 
findings from each be reliable and robust enough to inform policy? 
Marburger’s  (2006)  study  focuses  on  two  groups  of  students  studying  an 
introductory  module  in  microeconomics  in  two  consecutive  years  at  the  same 
university;  students  in  one    group  (no-policy)  are  told  that  the  university-wide   3 
attendance policy will not be applied to them and students in the other groups (policy) 
are subject to the university-wide attendance policy. Members of the no-policy group 
(n = 38) attended the module in 2002 while members of the policy group (n = 39) 
attended the same module in 2003; in both cases the module ran during the autumn 
semester and on Monday, Wednesday and Fridays (MWF) at midday.  
An overall picture of Marburger’s (2006) study can be seen in Table 1: in 2002 
a student in group 2 is a member of the no-policy group. Students in the other classes 
(10am  and  2pm)  in  that  year’s cohort are subject to the standard university-wide 
attendance regulations. To take into account that absenteeism might be endogenous to 
the day and timing of a particular class Marburger (2006) uses students from the same 
teaching slot in 2003 as the control group (policy).  
 





         
To make the ‘match’ between absenteeism and exam performance, Marburger 
recorded the class attendance of both groups in each lesson and, at the end of the 
lesson, devised  multiple choice questions that related to that lesson’s topic. These 
questions then appeared in later exams conducted over the semester. The hypothesis 
being tested is that absence from a lesson can be matched to an incorrect answer for 
the corresponding multi-choice exam question i.e., this “pure” effect of absenteeism 
could  be  detected  and  measured.  A  summary  of  Marburger’s  (2006)  results  is 
presented in Table 2. 
 
{Insert Table 2 about here} 
 
Table 2 shows that Marburger’s (2006) initial observations concur with others 
(Romer, 1993; Marburger, 2001) and that in the absence of any mandatory policy on 
attendance, absenteeism in the no-policy group increases throughout the semester. 
This phenomenon is not unfamiliar to most higher education tutors, these authors 
included; it is also a characteristic of our study (see Table 3).  
However, the magnitude of the absenteeism in relation to the university’s policy 
aspirations is not readily apparent. Using the information presented in his paper, we 
calculated that the attendance policy in Marburger’s study is designed to ensure that 
students  attend  83%  of  all  lectures  (i.e.  29 of the 35  classes timetabled over  the 
semester).
1  Marburger’s  results  show  an  average  rate  of  absenteeism  (over  the 
semester)  for  the  no-policy  group  of 20.78%; this compares with  11.52% for  the 
policy group; i.e. a student in the no-policy group missed an average of 7.3 classes 
over the semester, while a student in the policy class missed an average of 4 classes. If 
we re-interpret these values as average attendance rates we get 79.22% and 88.48% 
respectively; these numbers are about four and five percentage points either side of 
the 83% proscribed by the university’s policy. Unfortunately we do not know whether 
the  pattern  of  absenteeism  in  both  groups  was  random  or  the  result  of  particular 
individuals regularly absenting themselves from classes.
2 
Overall Marburger’s (2006) research design is in line with what we understand 
to  be  Romer’s  (1993)  suggestion  of  using  a  controlled  experiment  within  higher 
education. Although it is an experiment, we are not convinced that the students within 
the “no-policy” group are not influenced by students in the normal “policy” groups. 
This scepticism comes from taking a closer look at the circumstance surrounding the   4 
module and the research design used by Marburger. Referring back to Table 2 we can 
see that the no-policy group could have contact with at least five other groups – three 
from the previous year who would now be 2
nd year students to the no-policy group as 
well as students in the other two groups in the 2002 cohort. These five groups would 
be subject to the strictures of an attendance policy; clearly the same process could 
occur if the freshmen speak to third and fourth year students. The proximity of the no-
policy group  to these other groups is we feel cause for concern on at least three 
counts. 
First as the no-policy group is not within a ‘vacuum’ they will be influenced 
by forces outside of their own class. Research by Thomas et al. (2001) emphasises the 
effects of peer groups on student choice while Webber and Walton (2006) illustrate 
that peer groups can be gender specific. Absenteeism from university seminars may 
be the result of one friend’s attending either that seminar or another class on the same 
day,  and  not  an  independent  decision  by  the  student.  While  the  presence  and 
significance  of  friendships  are  difficult  to  model,  it  is  our  experience  that  many 
freshmen place a high value on the chance to socialise while at university such that 
attendance in class is often a bi-product of this socialising with friends. Thus if the no-
policy student’s friends are attending other seminars or lectures around the same time 
as they could be attending their own classes then the potential social benefits of non-
attendance would be less.  
Second we do not know if the students in the no-policy group also had other 
lessons on the same day; lessons which would be subject to the mandatory attendance 
policy. If so, the value of missing the microeconomics class might only be an hour’s 
worth  of  drinking  coffee  in  the  student’s  common  room;  a  small  pay-off  when 
compared to taking a whole day off to engage in employment.  
Third, habit needs to be taken into account; if the student attends all (or most) 
of their classes for other modules, then a conscientious choice must be made not to 
attend the microeconomics classes. 
These  three  possibilities  might  have  combined  to  reduce  the  impact  of 
removing mandatory attendance – that is to say the rates of absenteeism would have 
probably been higher if the no-policy group had been ‘in a vacuum’. 
Although there are cultural differences, UK universities that typically do not 
have mandatory attendance policies experience much higher rates of absenteeism than 
those reported in Marburger (2006). The effect in exam performance of implementing 
an attendance policy in the UK might be much larger. 
The small difference between Marburger’s two group’s exam performances 
(see Table 2, column 9) might also be explained in terms of the no-policy group’s 
proximity to these other groups. We might wonder whether, in the absences of follow 
up seminars (which are typical in the UK), all students in the 2002 cohort got together 
and formed ad hoc ‘study clubs’ to swot up on the questions likely to appear in that 
teaching block’s exam, which then improved the no-policy group’s performance and 
thereby weakening the ‘pure’ effects of absenteeism by this group.
3  
It  is our feeling  and for  reasons largely  out of his  control that Marburger’s 
(2006) experiment was not particularly robust or rigorous. After all if it was felt that 
the  control  conditions  were  robust  his  findings  would  suggest  that  for  first  year 
undergraduates, a mandatory policy of attendance (if not attendance itself) is virtually 
redundant. This is counter to most UK tutor’s work-a-day experience and which many 
US  tutors  would  probably  challenge.  What  can  be  reasonably  concluded  from 
Marburger (2006) is that the influence of the attendance policy on the other groups in 
the  no-policy  group’s  cohort  seems  to  have  had  spill  over  effects  –  ones  which   5 
facilitated beneficial peer group activity. This suggests that a policy of mandatory 
attendance  might  not  need  to  be  applied  to  all  the  modules  in  a  given year.  We 
develop our analysis of peer groups later in this script. 
 
3. Background to our study 
 
In order to assess the influence of an attendance policy on student performance we 
adopt the second of the two possible methods mentioned at the beginning of Section 
2. Hence in contrast to Marburger’s attempt to identify the effect of not enforcing a 
university-wide attendance policy, our analysis concerns an attempt to identify the 
effect of implementing an attendance policy which is not university-wide.
4 
Our empirical examination differs from Marburger’s (2006) study, but has a 
similar aim. Unlike the US, mandatory attendance policies in the UK are rare but 
where attendance is taken into consideration the usual practice is to award marks for 
attendance  at  seminars  and/or  lectures  which  then  make  up  part  the  coursework 
component of the student’s final mark. Indeed most UK tutors are not in a position to 
implement a mandatory attendance policy on their own modules as such a strategy 
would be against the ethos of their university. These conventions prevent us from 
replicating Marburger’s (2006) policy/no-policy experiment; instead we are studying 
the variation in student behaviour within one cohort of students where attendance 
forms part of the student’s final marks.  
The other major difference is our study draws on the experience of a tutor of a 
core level 3 module in international economic policy as opposed to Marburger’s focus 
on first year students studying microeconomics. It should be borne in mind that as a 
final year module many of the students would already know each other having shared 
many of the same classes in their first and second years. As a result we can be sure 
that some peer effects will be at work, in contrast to Marburger’s (2006) study where 
new social connections will evolve during the period of study. 
One final difference lies in the nature of the final exam, unlike Marburger’s 
students, the students in our study face one single end of year exam (3 hours long) 
which entails choosing four out of eight questions to answer. Unlike a multiple choice 
test where  the  known probabilities  of guessing correctly generally encourages the 
student to attempt all the questions, this exam requires the student to choose those 
questions they believe they have the best chance of gaining a high mark.  
As for similarities with Marburger (2006), we are testing the hypothesis that 
absence from a seminar can be matched to a low mark for an exam question relating 
to that seminar’s topic: i.e., the effect of absenteeism could be detected and measured. 
This similarity arises because, as in Marburger (2006), this module makes explicit the 




This module ran for the first 12 weeks of an autumn term. The whole cohort met in a 
lecture which took place at 10.30am on Thursdays, the students were split into three 
seminar groups; seminar group one met at 11.30am, seminar group two met at 1.30pm 
and seminar group three met at 3.30pm all on the same day as the lecture. 
As  part  of  the  assessment,  students  are  expected  to  write  two  essays  and 
present a recently published paper to their seminar class. These presentations take 
place in the seminar slots over the last eight weeks of the module. The papers all 
contributed  to  the  module’s  theme,  by  extending  or  complementing  a  particular   6 
argument, thus paper number 3 might be strongly related to the findings of papers 1 
and 2, while paper number 7 might challenge the findings of papers 3 to 5 and so on. 
All students in a presenting group received the same mark as determined by the tutor; 
the mark of their first essay is then weighted by their presentation mark. 
The students who make up the audience to these presentations also receive a 
‘mark’ which is conditional on handing in (at the end of the seminar) an evaluation of 
the presentation. To give structure to these evaluations all students used the same 
form. This form asks them to comment and grade the introduction, the structure of the 
presentation, the analysis, the clarity of argument, the conclusion and the usefulness 
of the presentation for their own revision – these forms are checked by the tutor and 
are  subsequently  handed  back  to  the  students.  The  submission  of  these  peer 
assessments can be thought of as a pseudo module-specific attendance policy as the 
total number of ‘ticks’ for attending presentations is then used to weight the students’ 
marks for their second essay.  
To make the link between attendance and the final exam explicit the students 
were informed that the eight questions in the end of year exam related directly and 
explicitly to each of the eight papers which the students presented over the term. 
Furthermore, all students were told that good quality cross-referencing to the other 
papers discussed in the module would attract higher marks in the exam. On several 
occasions  the  students  were  reminded  that  it  was  in  their  interests  to  attend  the 
presentations  as  it  would  count  towards  their  assessment  in  two  ways:  higher 
coursework grades and the opportunity to listen to something which they knew would 
definitely be in the exam.  
 
Group presentations: the marks and attendance rates 
 
Reflecting the central role that the eight presentations play in both the learning and 
assessment on this module, Table 3 shows the presentation marks and attendance 
across the three seminar groups for the whole cohort of 45 students who took this 
module.  This  table  shows,  by  group,  the  number  of  students  in  a  particular 
presentation ‘team’, the percentage mark the ‘team’ received, the rank of that mark in 
relation to the presentation marks for all ‘teams’ and finally the number of students 
who attended the seminar. The bottom of the table then shows the aggregated marks 
for the whole cohort. 
 
{Insert Table 3 about here} 
 
The first notable thing from Table 3 is the high levels of attendance – not unlike 
the  attendance  rates  for  the  policy  group  reported  in  Marburger’s  (2006)  study. 
However,  after  the  first  two  presentations  the  level  of  attendance  varies  and 
interestingly  the  rates  of  absence  between  two  of  the  seminar  groups  are  highly 
correlated. Correlations for attendance between group 1 and 2 and between group 1 
and 3 are 0.74 and 0.75 respectively. Interesting also is the relatively low rate of 
correlation of attendance between groups 2 and 3; here the correlation is only 0.4. The 
lowest rate of attendance (79% overall) for all groups was for seminar number 5. 
Contrary to the typical experience within UK universities, it can be seen that the 
average attendance rate in these seminars was very high at 90% a fact commented on 
when this average rate of attendance was discussed with colleagues in the department. 
 
   7 
4.   The model 
 
Our analysis does not consider the need to work for remuneration which might have 
impacted on the attendance decision; likewise it was not possible to collect data on 
whether the student was a local resident.
5 These are important variables and their 
exogenous  effects  should  by  subsumed  in  the  error  term;  if  they  did  not  change 
between level 2 and 3 then their effects might be included in the ability variable.
6 In 
order to look at the determinants of student’s exam performance (EXAM) for this 
cohort five important variables were parameterised; these relate to attendance, ability, 
two variables which represent attempts to capture the different learning and revision 
strategies students appear to adopt when preparing for the exam, and a peer group 
effect: 
 
Attendance (ATTENDANCE):  
The is the number of peer assessments submitted. The intention here is to see to what 
extent attendance in general might have on the final exam marks. Not surprisingly the 
correlation with the exam mark is 0.370 (see Table 4). 
 
Ability (ABILITY):  
The module had a prerequisite, and the exam mark for that module is used as an 
indicator of the student’s entry ability.
7 From Table 4 the correlation between ability 
and  exam  performance  is  0.171.  The  rather  low  correlation  suggests  that  these 
previous exam marks might not be the most suitable indicator of entry abilty. After 
all,  given  this  is  a  third  year  module,  we  might  expect  (if  not  hope)  to  see  a 
discernable  change  in  the  student’s  learning  behaviour  and  application  as,  like  a 
runner, they give their all as they approach the finishing line.
8 
 
Learning strategy for non-attendance (LSNA):  
The purpose of  this variable is to detect and measure  whether  there  has been an 
absenteeism effect, as postulated in Marburger (2006). There are eight students (21% 
of the sample) who have answered an exam question which related to a presentation 
they did not attend, these students are given a score of 1 and all others a score of zero. 
For students with a score of 1 we would expect a lower overall final exam mark. 
Table 4 shows that the correlation of LSNA with the exam mark is negative, at -0.127.  
  
Revision strategy for presentation question (RSPQ):  
On this module the more effort the student puts into preparing for their presentation 
then the less effort the student needs to put in for the revision of that question for the 
exam. To take account of this effect, we include in the regression the rank of the exam 
question which relates to their presentation. If the mark for the exam question that 
relates to their presentation was their best (or equal best) mark, then it would be coded 
4. If it was the second (or equal second) best then they would receive code of 3. If it 
was the third (or equal third) best then they would receive a code of 2. If it was their 
worst mark then it would be assigned a code of 1. Finally if they chose not to answer 
the question in the exam which related to the paper they presented then it would 
receive a value of zero. The correlation between this variable and exam mark is 0.286 
(see Table 4). It should be noted that this zero score is associated with six of the 
students in this sample and the average mark for these 6 presentations was 65.17% 
(sd: 6.80%), compared to 61.08% (sd: 12.04%) for all other presentations.   
   8 
Peer group ability (PGA):  
Finally as students mix with other students we should have a measure of peer groups. 
For each student we take the average ABILITY mark of all the other students in their 
seminar group. The correlation between this variable and exam performance is 0.160 
(see Table 4). 
 
{Insert Table 4 about here} 
 
Table 4 shows that ability is positively related with exam mark and attendance 
but negatively related with PGA and RSPQ. This could be explained by better able 
students  deciding  to  focus  their  revision  on  understanding  other  papers,  but 
unfortunately the student did not then put in the effort on the paper they presented 
because they thought they knew it well enough. Conversely it might be capturing the 
effect of less able students deciding to focus on getting a good answer in the exam for 
the paper they presented. Students who thought about the assessment of this module 
would realise that it is possible to get 25% of the total exam mark by answering one 
question perfectly. As the pass mark is 40%, only 5% is needed for each of their other 
three answers and so they would only need an average individual exam essay mark of 
20% for the other questions to pass the exam. Descriptive statistics relating to all these 
variables appear in Table 5.  
 
{Insert Table 5 about here} 
 
5.  Results 
 
Table 6 shows the results of the regressions, which all pass the RESET and F tests. 
We  start  by  isolating  the  attendance  effect  and  simply  regress  exam  mark  on 
attendance; these results are presented in column 1 of Table 6. The results suggest that 
for every seminar the student attended, the student could expect to receive a 4.1% 
increase in their exam mark. Attending a seminar will increase knowledge allowing 
the student to perform better in the exam. 
 
{Insert Table 6 about here} 
 
Column  2  then  presents  re-estimates  the  column  1  but this time including 
ability. Even after we have taken account of ability it appears that the student can 
expect to have a higher exam mark by 3.8% for every seminar they choose to attend. 
The  drop  in  the  magnitude  of  the  coefficient  might  illustrate  that  with  more 
explanatory variables and individual specific data further regressions might lead to the 
dilution of the effect of attendance on student achievement. Indeed, the use of student 
specific dummy variables, as employed by Marburger (2006) may have led to the 
identification  that  attendance  only  has  a  very  small  although  important  effect  on 
student achievement.  
We then progress to column 3. In addition to taking into account the impact of 
attendance and ability on exam performance we now include the effect of peer groups 
and  the  student’s  learning  and  revision  strategies  (LSNA  &  RSPQ).  Several 
interesting points should be emphasised here. First the R
2 increases substantially to 
0.348; suggesting that the addition of the extra explanatory variables greatly increase 
the explanatory power of the model. Second peer group effects are found to be a 
significant determinant of exam performance, suggesting that better quality peers aid 
the student’s learning ability – this is in line with much of the empirical literature on   9 
peer group effects which have come from a variety of contexts. Third ability has a 
positive effect on exam performance. Fourth the revision strategies are important for 
their exam performance: answering a question in the exam which corresponds to a 
seminar that the student did not attend has a positive effect. Earlier we observed that 
this variable is strongly negatively correlated with attendance; the interesting point 
however is that the raw data indicates that only one person attended less that 5 of the 8 
presentations,  and  this  should  have  provided  all  but  one  of  the  students  enough 
knowledge  to  answer  5  questions  in  the  exam  –  this  begs  the  question  why  the 
students decided to answer one of the other questions which they did not attend. 
The effect of the revision strategy for the presentation question is reassuring in 
that  this  variable  is  highly  statistically  significant  and  positive.  It  suggests  that 
students  who  provided  relatively better quality answers to the exam question that 
related to the paper they presented would also receive a higher overall exam mark: for 
every  increase  in  rank  for  the  presentation  related  question  then  they  would  also 
obtain a 2.8% higher mark for their overall exam mark. 
Finally, the results suggest that if the student answered a question relating to a 
missed presentation then they would have a higher mark. This is not what we would 
expect as it seems to suggest that students would do better if they do not attend. 
Nevertheless attempting these particular questions was a choice. We can understand 
how this result has come about by looking at the overall exam performance of these 
eight students as shown in Table 7. The shaded values denote the mark (out of 25) 
each student received for answering the question which related the presentation they 
did not attend. From Table 7 we can see that for all but student number 6 (from group 
one) this mark was greater than their average mark per question. Furthermore the 
attendance at presentations for all but student number 6 was at least 62% or above. 
 
{Insert Table 7 about here} 
 
While Table 6 explains how the learning strategy of non-attendance has come 
to have a positive effect it does not explain why it is the case. It follows that the low 
attendance of student number 6 would make it more difficult for them to exploit the 
skills and understanding of their peers, which is what we believe has occurred in the 
case of the other students. That is to say regular attendance which has been facilitated 
by the design of this module’s assessment and curriculum have enabled students to 
rely on their fellow students to help them learn and catch up on missed material – an 
effect we believe might have happened in Marburger’s (2006) study. 
The point of this exercise, however, is to investigate the effect of attendance 
on exam mark, and to show an appreciation of the complexity of the issue. Once we 
take into consideration the effects of peer groups and student specific revision and 
learning  strategies  then  the  effect  of  attendance  on  exam  mark  is  strong  and 
statistically  significant;  it  also  appears stable and robust to the inclusion of extra 
explanatory variables. Put another way, the lack of an appreciation of the contribution 
of peer groups and student strategies means that the effect of attendance on exam 
mark appears to be diluted. In our sample, once we take into account peer groups and 
student strategy the effect of attending one extra seminar would have increased the 
student’s exam mark by over 7.7%. This high value seems to vindicate the intention 
of this module’s curriculum, namely that it is designed to make the link between 
seminar activities and the final exam explicit and transparent to all students, as a result 
students’ attendance is improved. 
   10 
6.  Discussion 
 
The purpose of this paper was to analyse the methodology and findings of Marburger 
(2006) and to identify whether the effect of implementing an attendance had a similar 
effect as removing one. Marburger’s (2006) study indicates that the removal of a 
mandatory attendance policy has a small effect on exam performance, a magnitude of 
only 2%. The results presented in this study suggest that the implementation of an 
attendance policy increases exam performance: a student can expect to receive an 
extra 7.7% for each extra seminar they attend. 
In order to fully appreciate the differences in these results, we need to recognise 
that the removal of the mandatory attendance policy in Marburger’s (2006) study is 
set  within  an  environment  where  attendance  is  relatively  high,  at  about  85%. He 
observed only a small fall in attendance by the students to about 76%. This study 
shows that an attendance policy has contributed to the attainment of a 90% attendance 
rate; for comparison, our anecdotal evidence for the UK suggests that attendance can 
be as low as 35% by the end of the academic year. 
The relationship between attendance and exam performance may not be linear; 
the effect of attendance criteria on exam performance are likely to be much stronger at 
low  levels  of  attendance  and  are  likely to  reduce as attendance  rate rise. Further 
empirical  investigations  should  be undertaken to identify whether this  is the  case 
across disciplines, universities and countries. 
 
7.   Conclusion 
 
This  paper  has  investigated  the  relationship  between  attendance  and  exam 
performance. We constructively criticised Marburger’s (2006) study which suggests 
that higher attendance only has a small positive effect on exam performance. The 
paper has presented an alternative examination based on the effect of implementing an 
attendance policy; the results suggest there is a large effect on exam performance. 
Although  the  results  presented  here  suggest  that  attendance  is  important  in 
determining  exam  success,  other  factors  are  also  important  in  predicting  exam 
performance which are correlated with attendance; these include learning and revision 
strategies adopted by the students and peer group effects. 
   Common  to  both  studies  is  the  explicit  and  transparent  link  between 
attendance and the exam. This not only makes attendance more attractive, it reduces 
the need for students to speculate what will be in the exam making their revision both 
focused and efficient. It appears that in both studies the assessment design might have 
had a bigger role in determining exam success than both studies expected or indeed 
focused on. Nevertheless for first year students some form of attendance policy (either 
engineered through policy or encouraged by innovative curriculum design) might be 
desired if it aids students to develop social connections that they can rely on later, not 
only in their first year but in their final year. 
Finally,  the  disparities  in  the  results  suggest  that  the  relationship  between 
attendance  and  exam  performance  may  not  be  uniform  or  constant;  the  effect  of 
attendance criteria on exam performance is likely to be much stronger at low levels of 
attendance  and  is  likely  to  reduce  as  attendance  rate  rise.  Further  empirical 
investigations  should  be  undertaken  to  identify  whether  this  is  the  case  across 
disciplines, universities and countries. 
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Table 1: All Cohorts: 2001 to 2003 
2001 cohort  Control  2002 cohort  Control  2003 Cohort  Control 
(1) 10.00 MWF  Policy  (1) 10.00 MWF  Policy  (1) 10.00 MWF  Policy 
(2) 12.00 MWF  Policy  (2) 12.00 MWF  No - Policy  (2) 12.00 MWF  Policy 
(3) 2.00 MWF  Policy  (3) 2.00 MWF  Policy  (3) 2.00 MWF  Policy 
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Table 2: Summary of Marburger’s (2006) results 






















Policy               
(2002) 













I  12  1  13.8  12.5  1.7  1.5  9.0  0.06 
II  11  2  21.4  10.8  2.4  1.2  12.8  0.87 
III  12  3  27.2  11.2  3.3  1.3  14.0  1.96 
Average      20.78  11.52  7.3  4.0     
Sources: 
1Marburger (2006, fn5, p. 155); 
2Marburger (2006, p. 150); 
3Author calculations from our 
understanding of Marburger’s (2006) paper; 
4Marburger (2006, Table 5, p. 154)   14 
Table 3: Group presentations: marks and attendance 
Paper  number  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  Ave 
Group 1 (n = 17)  time: 11.30 am    
Number presenting  2  2  2  2  2  3  2  2   
Mark (%)  66  54  67  52  70  66  67  57  62.38 
Rank of mark   4  7  2  8  1  4  2  6    
No. attending   15  14  13  14  11  11  12  12  12.75 
Group 2 (n= 14) time 1.30 pm    
Number presenting   1  2  2  2  2  2  1  2   
Mark (%)  53  58  56  73  60  56  0  65  52.63 
Rank of mark  7  4  5  1  3  5  8  2    
No. attending   13  12  12  11  9  11  12  10  11.25 
Group 3 (n= 14) time 3.30 pm    
Number presenting   2  2  2  1  1  2  2  2   
Mark (%)  63  65  57  63  59  62  75  66  63.75 
Rank of mark   4  3  8  4  7  6  1  2    
No. attending   12  12  10  13  10  12  9  9  10.88 
Over all (n = 45)                            
Paper number  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8    
Number presenting   5  6  6  5  5  7  5  6   
Ave Mark (%)  62.2  59.0  60.0  62.6  63.8  62.0  56.8  62.7   61.14 
   4  7  6  3  1  5  8  2    
Total Attendance  45  44  41  43  35  41  38  37  40.50 
Attendance (%)  100  98  91  96  78  91  84  82  90 
Note: n = 45   15 
Table 4: Correlations between variables 
   EXAM  ATTENDANCE  ABILITY  LSNA  RSPQ  PGA 
EXAM  1  0.370  0.171  -0.127  0.286  -0.230 
ATTENDANCE  −  1  0.211  -0.783  0.056  -0.229 
ABILITY  −  −  1  -0.182  -0.231  -0.554 
LSNA  −  −  −  1  0.028  0.085 
RSPQ  −  −  −  −  1  -0.051 
PGA  −  −  −  −  −  1 
Note: Obs = 38.   16 
Table 5: Descriptive statistics of variables 
  Mean  SD  Skew  Max  Min  Kurtosis 
Exam  52  12.333  -1.405  70  14  4.943 
ATTENDANCE  7.289  1.113  -2.022  8  3  7.376 
ABILITY  58.921  10.226  -0.292  81  35  3.163 
LSNA  0.211  0.418  1.420  1  0  3.017 
RSPQ  2.421  1.464  -0.393  4  0  -1.840 
PGA   57.304  1.192  0.454  59.154  54.500  2.268 
Notes: Obs = 38   17 
Table 6: Regression results 
  1  2  3 
ATTENDANCE  4.103 (1.716)**  3.876 (1.771)**  7.736 (2.652)*** 
ABILITY    0.117 (0.193)  0.417 (0.219)* 
PGA      3.145 (1.846)* 
LSNA      13.333 (7.008)* 
RSPQ      2.777 (1.274)** 
Constant  22.088 (12.649)*  16.850 (15.407)  -218.694 (119.857)* 
       
F test  5.72**  2.99*  3.42** 
R
2  0.137  0.146  0.348 
RESET test  0.93  0.82  0.83 
Notes: Obs = 38.   18 
Table 7.   The exam performance of students answering an exam 
         question which related to a presentation they did not attend. 
Exam questions attempted  

















2 / 1  m  6  13      12      10  12  11.75  47 
3 / 1  m  5  11  15      14  9      12.25  49 
6 / 1  m  3  10  9  1  6          6.50  26 
16 / 2  m  7  10  18    15      7    12.50  50 
17 / 2  m  5  9  10  12    15        11.50  46 
18 / 2  m  7  15  14  16    14        14.75  59 
29 / 3  m  6  14      13  15    12    13.50  54 
30 / 3  f  6  14  16    17  14        15.25  61 
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1 In terms of the attendance policy, footnote 2 (page 154) states that a student who misses more than 
twice the number of lectures normally scheduled per week would receive an ‘F’ grade and that 
student who misses more than 6 microeconomics classes would receive an ‘F’.  
2 The reported results on the link between exam performance and absenteeism are rather surprising. 
From Table 2 we see that for all students, who missed a given class, the likelihood of responding 
incorrectly to a question relating to that class’s topic increases from 9% in exam 1 to 14% in exam 
3. Yet when absenteeism was at it highest for the no-policy group, in teaching block III and prior 
to the final exam, this group was only 2% more likely to get a wrong answer compared to those 
students in the policy group. 
3 As it is we can not speculate any further as Marburger does not tell us the distribution or average 
marks for all nine groups covering 2001 to 2003. Other concerns rest with the exam results, firstly 
we are given no details about the time or the length of the exams, or the number of multiple choice 
questions  that  were  set  or  the  number  of  choices  found  in  each  question.  Burton  (2001) 
demonstrates  that  a  typical  60-question  four-choice  test  is  “inherently  too  unreliable  for  the 
demands commonly placed on it” (p 47). If it turns out that the exams set during Marburger’s 
study where of this nature then the degree of guessing could be significant, and would comprise 
the validity of the final marks for all students. 
4 It is our view that the impact of either removing or imposing a policy on attendance is unlikely to be 
uniform across attendance rates or consistent across cohorts. Each approach will arrive at different 
conclusions which could then mislead policy makers. 
5 It is interesting to note from Marburger’s study that the local students worked less; this is most 
evidence in the policy class. In the no-policy class there were fewer locals and these individuals 
worked more hours on average. This may be associated with higher living costs for rent (not living 
at home with parents) and for travel costs to get back home to see the family 
6 The extent to which the year 2 mark accurately captures the student’s ability is questionable; the 
analysis of the changes in exam marks is presented below. 
    
Table  fn6:  Changes  in  exam  performance  between  year  2  and  year  3 for  this  sample  of 
students 
Grade Order  Observations  Average % Change 
70% +  4  -25.3% 
60 – 69%  13  -1.3% 
50 – 59%  16  +4.2% 
40 – 49%  3  +16.6% 
39% or less  2  +55.8% 
 
We would expect there to be some degree of regression to the mean, after all the exam mark 
captures ability and a degree of luck on the day; we would therefore expect students who received 
higher grades in level 2 to get lower grades in level 3 and for the reverse to have occurred for the 
less-able students. Of course, this is based on the proposition that there is an element of luck. If 
this were not generally the case then one might expect to see some degree of stratification in that 
relatively more- (less-) able students remain relatively more- (less-) able, and this should be borne 
out in the results. Nevertheless, we are surprised by the amount of average increase in the exam 
mark  for  students  at  the  bottom  end  of  the  distribution  and  further  research  should  focus  on 
attempting  to  identify  which  types  of  students  gain most  from  an  explicit  focus  on  attendance 
(either engineered by policy or by curriculum design). It might be possible to identify whether it is 
the least able students who gain the most from a heavy emphasis on attendance, as is hinted at in 
the above table. 
7 This prerequisite module is only applicable if the student followed a specific course. This prerequisite 
module was not taken by 7 students as they came to the module through a different (non-standard) 
route, which means that this data attrition reduces the sample to 38 in these descriptive statistics 
and the econometrics which follow.  
8 This possibility is further supported by the fact that the degree awarded to the student is based on 70% 
of the level 3 marks and 30% on their level 2 marks. 